

Fundamental Concepts of Statistics

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School Of Statistics

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General introduction

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Goals of the lecture

- recap the **basics** needed for the SOS
- learn **how** to be **critical** with statistics (in science, but not only)
- **focus** on **meaning** and **(mis)intuition** rather than mathematical rigour

Statistics versus probability (according to Persi Diaconis)

The problems considered by probability and statistics are inverse to each other. In probability theory we consider some underlying process which has some randomness [...] and we figure out what happens. In statistics we observe something that has happened, and try to figure out what underlying process would explain those observations.

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- keywords/concepts will be listed at the end of each section
→ make sure you know the ideas behind them!









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→ make sure you know the ideas behind them!
- statistics is almost like a language: you need practice to learn it!
→ compute/code as much as simple examples as you can **by yourself!**

Some references



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- a **rigorous presentation** of statistics and probability theory
- **demonstration** of existing theorems
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Feel free to interrupt any time if you have questions !

1. **Statistics**
2. **Probability**
3. **Statistical model**
4. **The two big schools**
5. **Parameter estimation and hypothesis testing**

Statistics

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 - Skewness: $\gamma_x = \overline{\left(\frac{x - \bar{x}}{\sigma_x}\right)^3}$ - asymmetry


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
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 - Kurtosis: $\beta_x = \left(\frac{x - \bar{x}}{\sigma_x}\right)^4$ - importance of tails

Sample characterisation - illustrations





blue: x_j , red: mean. black: median, green: σ_x

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
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Skewness and Kurtosis (using probability functions)



Right plot: Kurtosis $\gamma = \infty$ (red), 2 (blue), 1, 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, and 1/16 (gray), 0 (black)

A single value is NOT the sample



X Mean: 54.26

Y Mean: 47.83

X SD : 16.76

Y SD : 26.93


Corr. : -0.06

Notion of estimator (more on this later)

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


→ sample variance v_x is a **biased estimator** of the true variance.

But $\frac{1}{n-1} \sum (x_i - \bar{x})^2$ is unbiased.

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Statistical moments (more on this later)

- Order- r moment: $m_r = \overline{\left(\frac{x - \bar{x}}{\sigma_x}\right)^r}$ (relates directly to the mean of x^r)
- probability theory: all truth moments \equiv exact underlying probability
- **first** moments \equiv “**main**” features of the sample

Multidimensional sample

- single observation i = several numbers: $x_i \rightarrow (x_i^{(1)}, x_i^{(2)}, \dots, x_i^{(p)})$
- e.g. biological dataset: person size, weight, age and genre

Previous description applies to each variable $x_i^{(j)}$ but one can **now** explore **how variables behave wrt each other**.

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Covariance and correlations between two variables a and b :

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- probes if fluctuations around the mean are coherent for a and b
- covariance (and correlation) are symmetric - fortunate
- covariance of x with itself is the variance
- $\rho_{a,b} \in [-1, 1]$; 0 = uncorrelated (\neq indep!), (-)1 = (anti-)correlated

Covariance matrix or error matrix

- $C_{ij} = \rho_{ij} \times \sigma_i \sigma_j$ - real and symmetric.
- ρ_{ij} is the correlation matrix - symmetric with 1's on diagonal.

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
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 - find 'directions' which are uncorrelated (**Principal Component Analysis**)



- x_1 and x_2 both have a large σ
- but, they are highly correlated
- most of the information is in y_2 (smallest σ)
 - idea of **dimension reduction**
 - idea of **pre-processing** in ML

Correlation and dependence

Correlation \equiv *linear* dependence \Rightarrow dependence

BUT


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(Never go to the hospital, people there die 10 times more than at home)

Check [this website](#) for funny examples.

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
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
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Number of people who drowned by falling into a pool
correlates with
Films Nicolas Cage appeared in



Part I

descriptive statistics – sample – mean – (co)variance – (de)correlation

Probability

Caution: what follows is *not* mathematically rigorous

Random variable and associated probability

- a random variable X describes an **observable which is not certain**
- all possible outcomes - **realisations** - of X form a set Ω
- a probability P_i is associated to each realisation i of Ω
- $\{P_i\}$ must satisfy $P_i \in [0, 1]$ and $\sum P_i = 1$

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Simple concrete example: a flipping coin

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- these notions can be defined and manipulated **without any sample**

Coming back to estimators - I

Previously: sample mean \neq “true mean”. What is the true mean?

$$\mu = \sum_{\Omega} P_i x_i \quad ; \quad \sigma^2 = \sum_{\Omega} P_i \times (x_i - \mu)^2 \quad ; \quad m_r = \sum_{\Omega} P_i \times \left(\frac{x_i - \mu}{\sigma} \right)^r$$

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E.g. of the flipping coin

- $\mu = 1/2, \sigma = 1/2,$
- $m_r = 1$ if r is even, $m_r = 0$ if r is odd

Bayes theorem - math version

$$P(A|B) = P(A) \times \frac{P(B|A)}{P(B)}$$

Conditional probabilities and Bayes theorem

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Bayes theorem - meaningful version (to me, at least)

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- *evidence*: what we observed (e.g. measurement)

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Comments

- many ways to *understand* this fundamental equation
- in some case, each of these term has a [clear meaning](#)
- these two posts are quit interesting [post 1](#) and [post 2](#)

Understanding Bayes theorem

Example: *hypothesis = fire and evidence = smoke*

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→ difficult to assess (many sources of smoke), that's **the posterior**
- $P(\text{hypothesis})$: proba that there is a fire
→ this our **prior** knowledge about the hypothesis (often **arbitrary**)

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→ difficult to assess (many sources of smoke), that's **the posterior**
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N.B.: $P(\text{evidence})$ is independent from the hypothesis, and is sometime impossible to compute. It is often seen as a “normalization factor” and dropped while **comparing** different hypothesis.

Few examples:

- I'm not feeling so well → Am I sick ?
- There are clouds → will it rain?
- I attend to a school statistics → will I learn something?

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Always the same thinking:

1. you observe a fact
2. you wonder the probability of something, given that this fact happened
3. you have (sometimes rough/wrong) prior, based on past knowledge
4. your brain applies Bayes theorem, even you if don't know it!

Generalization to the continuous case

- There is a **whole continuum** of outcome (realization) for X
- Probability described by a **density probability function (PDF)**, $f(x)$:

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- moments **are** the Taylor expansion coefficients: $m_r = (-i)^r \left. \frac{d^r \varphi_x}{dt^r} \right|_{t=0}$

Binomial law: efficiency, trigger rates, ...

$$B(k; n, p) = C_k^n p^k (1-p)^{n-k}, \mu = np, \sigma = \sqrt{np(1-p)}$$

Poisson distribution: counting experiments, hypothesis testing

$$P(n; \lambda) = \frac{\lambda^n e^{-\lambda}}{n!}, \mu = \lambda, \sigma = \sqrt{\lambda}$$


Gauss distribution (aka Normal): many use-case (asymptotic convergence)

$$f(x; \mu, \sigma) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma} e^{-\frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{x-\mu}{\sigma}\right)^2}$$

Cauchy distribution (aka Breit-Wigner): particle decay width,

$$f(x; x_0, \gamma) = \frac{1}{\pi\gamma \left[1 + \left(\frac{x-x_0}{\gamma} \right)^2 \right]} \quad \mu \text{ and } \sigma \text{ not defined (divergent integral)}$$

Cumulative distribution and quantiles



Probability density function: $f(x)$

Cumulative distribution: $F(x)=y$


Inverse cumulative distribution: $x=F^{-1}(y)$

Median: x such that $F(x)=1/2 \rightarrow x_{1/2} = F^{-1}(1/2)$

Quantile of order α : $x_{\alpha} = F^{-1}(\alpha)$

How to describe several random variables simultaneously?

- X and Y are two random variables \rightarrow PDF is f_{XY} ,
- **several questions** can be asked about X , Y or both.




- Probability that $X \in [x, x + dx]$ and $Y \in [y, y + dy]$:
$$d^2P(x, y) = f_{XY}(x, y) dx dy$$
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
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Multidimensional normal distribution

$$f(\vec{x}; \vec{\mu}, \Sigma) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{(2\pi)^n \det \Sigma}} \exp\left(-\frac{1}{2} (\vec{x} - \vec{\mu})^T \Sigma^{-1} (\vec{x} - \vec{\mu})\right)$$

- $\vec{\mu}$ mean position of \vec{x} , Σ covariance matrix

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
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Central limit theorem

Caution: what follows is *not* mathematically rigorous

If n random variables $\{X_i\}$ are distributed according to the same PDF f_X with a defined mean μ_x and a std σ_x , then the random variable $Y = \frac{1}{n}(X_1 + \dots + X_n)$ is following a normal distribution of mean μ_x and std σ_x/\sqrt{n} .

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For 2 variables $Y = X_1 + X_2$

- The PDF of Y is $f_Y(y) = \int f_{X_1}(x_1) \times f_{X_2}(y - x_1) dx_1 \rightarrow$ convolution!
- Characteristic function: $\varphi_Y(t) = \varphi_{X_1}(t) \times \varphi_{X_2}(t) = \varphi_X(t)^2$ - same PDF!
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


Generalizing for sum of n variables:

- $\varphi_Y(t) = \varphi_X(t)^n \sim \left(1 - \frac{t^2}{n}\right)^n \rightarrow e^{-\frac{1}{2}t^2}$ for $n \rightarrow \infty$
- going back to real space, a normal distribution is obtained

N.B. this reasoning doesn't explain why $\sigma_Y = \sigma_x/\sqrt{n}$, this needs to properly re-scale Y .







Central limit theorem – continued

One way to understand why it works



Central limit theorem – continued

One way to understand why it works



Proof

Prove that $\sigma_Y = \sigma_X/\sqrt{n}$ with the proper scalings to define Y .

Application

Prove, using the CLT, that a Poisson distribution $P(n; \lambda)$ tends to a normal distribution for large numbers.

Hint: $N = 1 + 1 + 1 \dots + 1$ N-times

Function of random variables

Final observable is very often a combination of (random) variable.

- $\mathcal{O} = g(X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n) \equiv g(\vec{X})$. \mathcal{O} is also a **random variable**
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Comments:

- these equations are known as **error propagation**
- **this procedure is not exact** and relies on **Taylor expansion**
- only 1st and 2nd moments of \vec{X} are needed (or their **estimators**)

Error propagation formula is not exact

(Counter) example with one variable

- X follows a normal distribution ($\sigma_X = 1, \mu_X = 0$), $Y = e^X$

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
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Part I: statistics

descriptive statistics – sample – mean – (co)variance – (de)correlation


Part II: probability

Bayes theorem – prior – posterior – random variable – (marginal) PDF –
moments – characteristic function – (in)dependent variables –
CLT – error propagation

1. **Statistics**
2. **Probability**
3. **Statistical model**
4. **The two big schools**
5. **Parameter estimation and hypothesis testing**


Statistical model

Statistical model: what, why, how



What? missing piece between the “sample” and “probability”


Statistical model: what, why, how



What? missing piece between the “sample” and “probability”

Why? because a measurement is **always one** realization of a random variable.

Statistical model: what, why, how




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
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
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- (pseudo-)observations, written \vec{x} (or x)
- parameters we want: **parameter(s) of interest**, written $\vec{\mu}$ or μ (POI)
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A **statistical model** is also called **likelihood function** $\mathcal{L}(\vec{\mu}, \vec{\theta}; \vec{x})$. It can be seen as the **probability** that the physical model predicts the observable \vec{x} , **given the parameters** $(\vec{\mu}, \vec{\theta})$.

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
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Statistical model

$$\mathcal{L}(\sigma; N) = e^{-\sigma L \epsilon} \frac{(\sigma L \epsilon)^N}{N!}$$

Illustration of the Likelihood


Given a value of σ , what's the “probability” to observe N ?



Anticipation: frequentist “usage” of the likelihood

Illustration of the Likelihood

If we observed a value for N , what's the “probability” that $\sigma = X$?



Anticipation: bayesian “usage” of the likelihood

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Systematic uncertainties turn **numbers into new random variables**.

Their PDFs depend on parameters, we don't really care about: **nuisance parameters**. *Example of systematic parametrization:*

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- histograms are used - not only event counts
- Many processes are usually needed to describe data
- Some are known (backgrounds), others are to be measured (signals)

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Questions for the audience. From a statistical point of view:

- Does the order of bins in the histogram matter for the result?
- Why do we multiply terms?

A first discussion on uncertainties

Caution

Systematic uncertainty estimation *and* treatment is **not** an exact science.

(While statistics deals with the non-certain, systematic uncertainties says we don't exactly know the PDF quantifying the non-certain)

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Implications:

- **arbitrariness** (and a looooot of discussion that go with it)
- always check the robustness of the conclusion wrt to those
- **that's the way it is, no choice!** → be *smartly* practical!

Part I: statistics


descriptive statistics – sample – mean – (co)variance – (de)correlation

Part II: probability

Bayes theorem – prior – posterior – random variable – (marginal) PDF –
moments – characteristic function – (in)dependent variables –
CLT – error propagation

Part III: statistical model

Likelihood – nuisance parameter – parameter of interest –
systematic uncertainties



1. **Statistics**
2. **Probability**
3. **Statistical model**
4. **The two big schools**
5. **Parameter estimation and hypothesis testing**

The two big schools

Frequentist versus bayesian

	Frequentist	Bayesian
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The two approaches in a nutshell:

- frequentist → probability of observation, given a model
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Methodologies

- *frequentist*: estimates frequencies, by emulating repetitions of the experiment (toys) for a given parameter, using the **likelihood** as PDF
- *bayesian*: exploits the **Bayes theorem** to compute the posterior $P(\text{para}|\text{obs})$, using the **prior** $P(\text{para})$ and $P(\text{obs}|\text{para})$ - the **likelihood**

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We toss a coin 113 times and we got 'tail' 68 times. Is the coin tricked?

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- N (known parameter): number of tosses
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
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
Let's try to analyze this [same experiment](#) with both [frequentist](#) and [bayesian](#) approaches

Is a flipping coin tricked? Frequentist approach




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14.1% of pseudo-experiments using an normal coin would lead to $N_{tail} \geq 68$

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


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


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
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
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


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
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


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
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→ this question has no sense in frequentist


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
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
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


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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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Is a flipping coin tricked? Bayesian approach


$$P(p|N_{tail}) = \text{Prior}(p) \times \frac{P(N_{tail}|p)}{P(N_{tail})}$$

Flat prior




Most probable value is
 $p = 0.60$

Wide centered prior



Most probable value is
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Narrow centered prior



Most probable value is
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
In the end, is the coin tricked?

- we can **only** state **credibility interval** for p , which is **prior-dependent**
- according to you, is $p = 0.57$ more probable than $p = 0.50$?

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
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
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
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
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 - expect it depends on the **choice of the prior** ...




So ... Is this coin tricked or not?

Well ... statistics can't say for sure (**science** of handling the “not fully certain”).
The unambiguous answer **exists** only in the limit of **infinite number of measurements**. **What both methods say in that case?**

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Frequentist



Frequentists say “Yes, the coin is tricked!”

Certainty comes from the extremely low fraction of pseudo-experiments of a normal coin, that would lead the observed result.

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Handling many measurements in Bayesian

- prior is built while accumulating knowledge, **suppressing the arbitrariness**

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
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
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Bayesian, posterior for various priors


$N_{\text{meas}} = 1$



$N_{\text{meas}} = 10$



$N_{\text{meas}} = 100$



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
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
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
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Bayesians also say “Yes, the coin is tricked!”

Frequentist v.s. Bayesian: what to take away

1. Both approaches handle differently the “non fully certain”
2. Final conclusions should be compatible, even if the question they address are not exactly the same.
3. Both approaches get unified when
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 - the prior is uniform: $P(par|obs) = A \times \mathcal{L}(par; obs)$
(same equation, but its meaning and the question it addresses *are* different)

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
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One thing I like from each approach

- probability interpretation from the frequentist
- ranking two theories using their probability, called **Bayes factors**


Aparte: A Recent Example of Bayes Factors

Courtesy of Adrien Aurio



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Effective Fields Theory (EFT):

- **Systematic way** to extend the SM (fixing the field content, symmetries, and dimension)
- Conceptually:
 - (almost) **UV-independant parametrization** of new phenomena
- Technically:
 - a set of coefficients (strength of each new term in the lagrangian)
 - to be **fitted using many measurements**

Aparte: A Recent Example of Bayes Factors

“Dimension-Six Terms in the Standard Model Lagrangian” – arXiv:1008.4884

X^3		φ^6 and $\varphi^4 D^2$		$\varphi^2 \varphi^3$	
Q_G	$f^{ABC} G_\mu^A G_\nu^B G_\rho^C$	Q_φ	$(\varphi^\dagger \varphi)^3$	$Q_{\varphi\varphi}$	$(\varphi^\dagger \varphi)(\bar{l}_r \epsilon_r \varphi)$
$Q_{\tilde{G}}$	$f^{ABC} \tilde{G}_\mu^A G_\nu^B G_\rho^C$	$Q_{\varphi\Box}$	$(\varphi^\dagger \varphi) \Box (\varphi^\dagger \varphi)$	$Q_{\varphi\varphi\varphi}$	$(\varphi^\dagger \varphi)(\bar{q}_\mu \varphi \varphi)$
Q_W	$\varepsilon^{IJK} W^I W^J W^K$	$Q_{\varphi D}$	$(\varphi^\dagger D^\mu \varphi)^\dagger (\varphi^\dagger D_\mu \varphi)$	$Q_{\varphi\varphi\varphi}$	$(\varphi^\dagger \varphi)(\bar{q}_\mu d_\nu \varphi)$
$Q_{\tilde{W}}$	$\tilde{W}^I W^J W^K$				
	Triboson		Higgs potential		Higgs-fermions
$X^2 \varphi^2$		$\varphi^2 X \varphi$		$\varphi^2 \varphi^2 D$	
$Q_{\varphi G}$	$\varphi^\dagger \varphi G_\mu^A G_\nu^A$	$Q_{\varphi W}$	$(\bar{l}_r \sigma^{\mu\nu} \epsilon_r) \tau^I \varphi W_{\mu\nu}^I$	$Q_{\varphi\Box}^{(1)}$	$(\varphi^\dagger \vec{D}_\mu \varphi)(\bar{l}_r \gamma^\mu \epsilon_r)$
$Q_{\varphi\tilde{G}}$	$\varphi^\dagger \varphi \tilde{G}_\mu^A G_\nu^A$	$Q_{\varphi B}$	$(\bar{l}_r \sigma^{\mu\nu} \epsilon_r) \varphi B_{\mu\nu}$	$Q_{\varphi\Box}^{(2)}$	$(\varphi^\dagger i \vec{D}_\mu^I \varphi)(\bar{l}_r \tau^I \gamma^\mu L_r)$
	Higgs-bosons		Higgs-bosons-fermions	$Q_{\varphi\Box}^{(3)}$	$(\varphi^\dagger i \vec{D}_\mu \varphi)(\bar{e}_r \gamma^\mu \epsilon_r)$
$Q_{\varphi B}$	$\varphi^\dagger \varphi B_{\mu\nu} B^{\mu\nu}$	$Q_{\varphi\Box}$	$(\bar{q}_\mu \sigma^{\mu\nu} u_\nu) \varphi B_{\mu\nu}$	$Q_{\varphi\Box}^{(4)}$	$(\varphi^\dagger i \vec{D}_\mu^I \varphi)(\bar{q}_r \gamma^\mu q_r)$
$Q_{\varphi\tilde{B}}$	$\varphi^\dagger \varphi \tilde{B}_{\mu\nu} B^{\mu\nu}$	$Q_{\varphi\Box}$	$(\bar{q}_\mu \sigma^{\mu\nu} T^A d_\nu) \varphi B_{\mu\nu}$	$Q_{\varphi\Box}^{(5)}$	$(\varphi^\dagger i \vec{D}_\mu^I \varphi)(\bar{q}_r \tau^I \gamma^\mu q_r)$
$Q_{\varphi WB}$	$\varphi^\dagger \tau^I \varphi W_{\mu\nu}^I B^{\mu\nu}$	$Q_{\varphi\Box}$	$(\bar{q}_\mu \sigma^{\mu\nu} d_\nu) \tau^I \varphi W_{\mu\nu}^I$	$Q_{\varphi\Box}^{(6)}$	$(\varphi^\dagger i \vec{D}_\mu \varphi)(\bar{u}_r \gamma^\mu u_r)$
$Q_{\varphi\tilde{W}B}$	$\varphi^\dagger \tau^I \varphi \tilde{W}_{\mu\nu}^I B^{\mu\nu}$	$Q_{\varphi\Box}$	$(\bar{q}_\mu \sigma^{\mu\nu} d_\nu) \tau^I \varphi B_{\mu\nu}$	$Q_{\varphi\Box}^{(7)}$	$(\varphi^\dagger i \vec{D}_\mu \varphi)(\bar{d}_r \gamma^\mu d_r)$
				$Q_{\varphi\Box}^{(8)}$	$i(\varphi^\dagger D_\mu \varphi)(\bar{u}_r \gamma^\mu d_r)$

four-fermions

$(LL)(LL)$		$(RR)(RR)$		$(LL)(RR)$	
Q_{ll}	$(\bar{l}_r \gamma_\mu l_r)(\bar{l}_r \gamma^\mu l_r)$	Q_{ee}	$(\bar{e}_r \gamma_\mu e_r)(\bar{e}_r \gamma^\mu e_r)$	Q_{le}	$(\bar{l}_r \gamma_\mu l_r)(\bar{e}_r \gamma^\mu e_r)$
$Q_{ll}^{(1)}$	$(\bar{q}_r \gamma_\mu u_r)(\bar{q}_r \gamma^\mu u_r)$	Q_{uu}	$(\bar{u}_r \gamma_\mu u_r)(\bar{u}_r \gamma^\mu u_r)$	Q_{lu}	$(\bar{l}_r \gamma_\mu l_r)(\bar{u}_r \gamma^\mu u_r)$
$Q_{ll}^{(2)}$	$(\bar{q}_r \gamma_\mu \tau^I q_r)(\bar{q}_r \gamma^\mu \tau^I q_r)$	Q_{dd}	$(\bar{d}_r \gamma_\mu d_r)(\bar{d}_r \gamma^\mu d_r)$	Q_{ld}	$(\bar{l}_r \gamma_\mu l_r)(\bar{d}_r \gamma^\mu d_r)$
$Q_{ll}^{(3)}$	$(\bar{l}_r \gamma_\mu L_r)(\bar{q}_r \gamma^\mu q_r)$	Q_{uu}	$(\bar{e}_r \gamma_\mu e_r)(\bar{u}_r \gamma^\mu u_r)$	Q_{le}	$(\bar{q}_r \gamma_\mu q_r)(\bar{e}_r \gamma^\mu e_r)$
$Q_{ll}^{(4)}$	$(\bar{l}_r \gamma_\mu \tau^I L_r)(\bar{q}_r \gamma^\mu \tau^I q_r)$	Q_{dd}	$(\bar{e}_r \gamma_\mu e_r)(\bar{d}_r \gamma^\mu d_r)$	$Q_{le}^{(1)}$	$(\bar{q}_r \gamma_\mu q_r)(\bar{u}_r \gamma^\mu u_r)$
		$Q_{dd}^{(1)}$	$(\bar{u}_r \gamma_\mu u_r)(\bar{d}_r \gamma^\mu d_r)$	$Q_{le}^{(2)}$	$(\bar{q}_r \gamma_\mu T^A q_r)(\bar{u}_r \gamma^\mu T^A u_r)$
		$Q_{dd}^{(2)}$	$(\bar{u}_r \gamma_\mu T^A u_r)(\bar{d}_r \gamma^\mu T^A d_r)$	$Q_{le}^{(3)}$	$(\bar{q}_r \gamma_\mu q_r)(\bar{d}_r \gamma^\mu d_r)$
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$Q_{quqd}^{(1)}$	$(\bar{q}_\mu^c u_\mu) \varepsilon_{\mu\nu} (\bar{q}_\nu^c d_\nu)$	Q_{eeuu}	$\varepsilon^{\alpha\beta\gamma\delta} [(\bar{e}_\alpha^c)^T C e_\beta^c] [(\bar{e}_\gamma^c)^T C e_\delta^c]$		
$Q_{quqd}^{(2)}$	$(\bar{q}_\mu^c T^A u_\mu) \varepsilon_{\mu\nu} (\bar{q}_\nu^c T^A d_\nu)$	Q_{eeuu}	$\varepsilon^{\alpha\beta\gamma\delta} [(\bar{e}_\alpha^c)^T C e_\beta^c] [(\bar{e}_\gamma^c)^T C e_\delta^c]$		
$Q_{lell}^{(1)}$	$(\bar{l}_r^c \epsilon_r) \varepsilon_{\mu\nu} (\bar{l}_\mu^c e_\nu)$	Q_{eeuu}	$\varepsilon^{\alpha\beta\gamma\delta} [(\bar{e}_\alpha^c)^T C e_\beta^c] [(\bar{e}_\gamma^c)^T C e_\delta^c]$		
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$Q_{\varphi W}$	$\varphi^\dagger \varphi W_{\mu\nu}^I W^{I\mu\nu}$	$Q_{\psi\psi}$	$(\bar{\psi}_L \vec{D}_\mu \varphi)(\psi \gamma^\mu e_\nu)$	Q_{φ^3}	$(\varphi^\dagger \vec{D}_\mu^I \varphi)(\bar{\psi}_L \gamma^\mu \psi)$
$Q_{\varphi B}$	$\varphi^\dagger \varphi B_{\mu\nu} B^{\mu\nu}$	$Q_{\psi\psi}$	$(\bar{\psi}_L \vec{D}_\mu^I \varphi)(\bar{\psi}_L \gamma^\mu \psi)$	Q_{φ^4}	$(\varphi^\dagger \vec{D}_\mu^I \varphi)(\bar{\psi}_L \tau^I \gamma^\mu \psi)$
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$Q_{\varphi \tilde{W}B}$	$\varphi^\dagger \tau^I \varphi \tilde{W}_{\mu\nu}^I B^{\mu\nu}$	$Q_{\psi\psi}$	$(\bar{\psi}_L \sigma^{\mu\nu} d_\nu) \varphi B_{\mu\nu}$	Q_{φ^7}	$i(\varphi^\dagger D_\mu \varphi)(\bar{u}_R \gamma^\mu d_\nu)$

four-fermions

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		$Q_{dd}^{(1)}$	$(\bar{u}_R \gamma_\mu u_R)(\bar{d}_R \gamma^\mu d_R)$	$Q_{le}^{(2)}$	$(\bar{q}_L \gamma_\mu \tau^I q_L)(\bar{e}_R \gamma^\mu \tau^I e_R)$
		$Q_{dd}^{(2)}$	$(\bar{u}_R \gamma_\mu T^A u_R)(\bar{d}_R \gamma^\mu T^A d_R)$	$Q_{le}^{(3)}$	$(\bar{q}_L \gamma_\mu \tau^I q_L)(\bar{d}_R \gamma^\mu T^A d_R)$
$(\bar{L}R)(\bar{L}R)$ and $(\bar{L}R)(LR)$		B -violating			
Q_{lede}	$(\bar{l}_R^c e_R)(\bar{d}_R^c e_R)$	Q_{eeee}	$\varepsilon^{\alpha\beta\gamma\delta} [(\bar{e}_R^\alpha)^2 C e_R^\beta] [(\bar{e}_R^\gamma)^2 C e_R^\delta]$		
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$Q_{quqd}^{(2)}$	$(\bar{q}_L^c T^A u_R) \varepsilon_{\mu\nu} (\bar{q}_L^c T^A d_\nu)$	Q_{eeuu}	$\varepsilon^{\alpha\beta\gamma\delta} [(\bar{e}_R^\alpha)^2 C e_R^\beta] [(\bar{e}_R^\gamma)^2 C e_R^\delta]$		
$Q_{lelu}^{(1)}$	$(\bar{l}_R^c e_R) \varepsilon_{\mu\nu} (\bar{q}_L^c u_R)$	Q_{eeuu}	$\varepsilon^{\alpha\beta\gamma\delta} [(\bar{e}_R^\alpha)^2 C e_R^\beta] [(\bar{e}_R^\gamma)^2 C e_R^\delta]$		
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
For comparison, QED in his full glory is written as

$$\mathcal{L} = -\frac{1}{4} F_{\mu\nu} F^{\mu\nu} + \bar{\psi}(i\gamma^\mu \partial_\mu - m)\psi - e j^\mu A_\mu$$

Aparte: A Recent Example of Bayes Factors

Example of global fit:

Courtesy of Lucas Mantani



The dream: fitting many measurements and see non-zero coefficient where new interactions are present.

How to formally define one theory among all possible ones ?

Aparte: A Recent Example of Bayes Factors

How to formally define one theory among all possible ones ?

Define a theory as a **vector** in a **theory space**, one can define/compute **posterior** in that space.

We specify models with binary vectors

$$\vec{b} = (b_1, \dots, b_d), \quad b_i \in \{0, 1\}$$

$$\vec{c}_{\vec{b}} = \{c_i \mid b_i = 1\} \text{ Parameters of each model}$$

$$\vec{b} = \vec{0} \quad \text{SM}$$

$$\vec{b} = \vec{1} \quad \text{Traditional global fit}$$

$$p(\vec{b} \mid D) = \frac{p(D \mid \vec{b}) p(\vec{b})}{\sum_{\vec{b}'} p(D \mid \vec{b}') p(\vec{b}')}$$

Fundamental target:
posterior distribution in model space

$$p(D \mid \vec{b}) = \int d\vec{c}_{\vec{b}} p(D \mid \vec{c}_{\vec{b}}, \vec{b}) p(\vec{c}_{\vec{b}} \mid \vec{b})$$

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Aparte: A Recent Example of Bayes Factors

Extraction of the probability that a given (single) new interaction is realized in data.

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$$p_{\mathcal{O}_i} = \sum_{\{b_j\}_{j \neq i} \in \{0,1\}^{N-1}} p(b_1, b_2, \dots, b_i = 1, \dots, b_N)$$

Fix the one we are interested in

Joint probability distribution of models


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Joint probability distribution of models



Good evidence for $c_{\varphi D}$
already at LHC+LEP

The tera-Z program
nails $c_{\varphi D}$ for good

ZH production gives us
evidence for two more WCs

Part I: statistics

descriptive statistics – sample – mean – (co)variance – (de)correlation

Part II: probability


Bayes theorem – prior – posterior – random variable – (marginal) PDF –
moments – characteristic function – (in)dependent variables –
CLT – error propagation

Part III: statistical model

Likelihood – nuisance parameter – parameter of interest –
systematic uncertainties

Part IV: The two big school

Frequentist – occurrence frequency – pseudo-data (toys) – bayesian –
degree of belief



1. **Statistics**
2. **Probability**
3. **Statistical model**
4. **The two big schools**
5. **Parameter estimation and hypothesis testing**

Parameter estimation, hypothesis testing

Program of this section

Basics of **parameter estimation** in both **frequentist** and **bayesian**,
explained on a **simple linear fit**.

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3. Coming back on nuisance parameters (*i.e.* uncertainties on the model)

Frequentist approach: estimators

Definition: random variable which gives a 'good' estimate of your parameter of interest ($\hat{\mu} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_i x_i$ as estimator of $\mathbb{E}[X]$). Estimator depends on observation $\hat{\mu}(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ and is *not* constant. N_{meas} needed to assess its quality.

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Two important examples of estimators

1. Maximum likelihood estimator (MLE): $\hat{\mu}$ which maximizes $\mathcal{L}(\mu; x)$
 \rightarrow numerically easier to minimize $-2 \ln \mathcal{L}(\mu; x)$ - **negative log likelihood (NLL)**
2. χ^2 estimator: $\hat{\mu}$ which minimizes $\chi^2(\mu) \equiv \sum_i w_i (X_i^{pred}(\mu) - x_i)^2$

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- consistency + finite variance \rightarrow no bias
- consistency \rightarrow no bias + vanishing variance

[More information on this post.](#)

Example: linear fit

Model $N^{pred}(p_0, p_1; t) = p_0 + p_1 t$

4 estimators (or “cost function”) are used:


$$-2 \log \mathcal{L}_{poisson}$$

$$\chi^2(p_0, p_1) = \sum_i (N_i^{pred}(p_0, p_1) - N_i)^2$$



$$\chi_{Pearson}^2(p_0, p_1) = \sum_i \left(\frac{N_i^{pred}(p_0, p_1) - N_i}{\sqrt{N_i^{pred}(p_0, p_1)}} \right)^2$$

$$\chi_{Neyman}^2(p_0, p_1) = \sum_i \left(\frac{(N_i^{pred}(p_0, p_1) - N_i)^2}{\sqrt{N_i}} \right)^2$$




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


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
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Comments:

- $\chi^2_{\text{Pearson}} \equiv -2 \log \mathcal{L}_{\text{Gauss}} \approx -2 \log \mathcal{L}_{\text{Poiss}}$ for large numbers


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
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
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

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→ goodness-of-fit is possible to evaluate since χ^2 PDF is known

The basics of goodness-of-fit




$\chi^2_{\min} = 6.7$ with 10 data points ($nDoF = 10$) \rightarrow blue PDF tells us this is a **good fit**, *even if* not a point is on the line.

We can actually compute the **fraction of pseudo-data** that would lead to a **higher χ^2** (p -value), to **quantify** this statement.

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2. Imagine you have one dataset, but you want to fit simultaneously two distributions of these events. How to write the χ^2 ?



Confidence interval and level $\mu \in [\mu_{min}, \mu_{max}]$ @ α CL

- \equiv the true value is in $[\mu_{min}, \mu_{max}]$ in $\alpha\%$ of all possible realisations
- μ_{min} (μ_{max}) is the lower (upper) bound
- α is the confidence level
- μ_{min} and μ_{max} are random variables (as $\hat{\mu}$): fluctuate with data

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n is called “number of σ ” and $\alpha(n)$ is known for a normal PDF:

- $\alpha(1) = 68\%$
- $\alpha(1.64) = 90\%$
- $\alpha(1.95) = 95\%$
- $\alpha(2) = 95.4\%$
- $\alpha(3) = 99.7\%$
- $\alpha(5) = 99.99994\%$

Quality of a given confidence interval (CI)

- CI \equiv random variable: consider the **limit of ∞ number of meas.**
- **Coverage** \equiv probability P that the true parameter *actually is* in C
- “Confidence level = what we target” while “coverage = what we get”

The 3 cases

1. $P = \alpha$: perfect coverage \rightarrow ideal
2. $P > \alpha$: over-coverage \rightarrow acceptable (conservative conclusions)
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In practice: **estimating coverage** can be done using **toys experiment** (CPU-intensive for realistic models).


Frequentist parameter uncertainty

Example: binomial distribution, with parameter of interest p

$$P(k; N, p) = \binom{N}{k} p^k (1-p)^{N-k}$$

$$\hat{p} = \frac{k}{N}$$

$$p \in \left[\hat{p} - d \sqrt{\frac{\hat{p}(1-\hat{p})}{N}}; \hat{p} + d \sqrt{\frac{\hat{p}(1-\hat{p})}{N}} \right] \quad (\text{Wald interval})$$




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Take away messages:

- notation $\mu = X_{-Z}^{+Y}$ (assuming 68% C.L.) is sometimes only *indicative*
- *only object* which contains the *full* information is the *likelihood*
- OK to use these approximate quantities - *just know what they are*(n't)

From the posterior to the final value: given $f(\mu) \equiv P(\mu|data)$

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 - **mean**: $\hat{\mu} = \int \mu f(\mu) d\mu$
 - **median**: $\hat{\mu}$ such as $P(\mu > \hat{\mu}) = P(\mu < \hat{\mu}) = 1/2$

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
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
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- Replace $\mathbb{E}[\mu]$ by the mode, or the median ...

Bayesian parameter estimation




Bayesian parameter estimation



Take away messages:

- as in frequentist, the notation $\mu = X_{-Z}^{+Y}$ is sometimes only indicative
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
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
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Coming back to model uncertainties - I

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- this is the notion of **auxiliary measurement**.
- including exact LHs of all aux. meas. is usually **too complicated**
- approx by its **2nd order Taylor expansion** around the minimum obtained at $r_E = \hat{r}_E$ (\equiv **gaussian likelihood**)

$$\text{NLL}(r_E) \approx \text{NLL}(\hat{r}_E) + \frac{(r_E - \hat{r}_E)^2}{2\sigma_E^2}$$

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
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- the final likelihood is **marginalized** over θ :


$$\mathcal{L}_m(\mu; data) = \int \mathcal{L}(\mu, \theta; data) \pi(\theta) d\theta$$

- Interpretation: **average all possible situations** (defined by a θ value), accounting for the **probability of occurrence** of each of them.

Example of marginalization



Example of marginalization



Uncertainty implementation : frequentist or bayesian ?

- no absolute answer to this question \rightarrow arbitrariness
- choice depending on the context (interpretation, calculation, ...)
- always check the robustness of your conclusion wrt these choices

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
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
Most naive approach: event count as test statistics $t = N$

- e.g. H_1 predicts $N_1 = 110$, while H_0 predicts $N_1 = 100$
- observation $N_{obs} = 112$: do I reject the signal hypothesis?
- Steps of test hypothesis
 - find distribution of t in both hypothesis $f(t|H_0)$ and $f(t|H_1)$
 - check where t_{obs} fall wrt to $f(t|H_0)$ and $f(t|H_1)$
 - conclude with a confidence level (p -value)

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
Test of Hypothesis



Quantitative agreement with an hypothesis: p -value

p -value = probability to observe what you observed in measurement or "more extreme" values

How to find exclusion limit



→ Increase the signal until the signal hypothesis get rejected (at a given confidence level).



Egon Pearson



Jerzy Neyman

Pearson-Neyman Lemma (1933)

- the most powerful statistical test is **Negative Log Likelihood Ratio**

$$NLLR \equiv -2 \log \frac{\mathcal{L}(H_1|data)}{\mathcal{L}(H_0|data)}$$



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In practice: **hundreds or thousands of event counts!**

Part I: statistics

descriptive statistics – sample – mean – (co)variance – (de)correlation

Part II: probability

Bayes theorem – prior – posterior – random variable – (marginal) PDF – moments – characteristic function – (in)dependent variables – CLT – error propagation

Part III: statistical model

Likelihood – nuisance parameter – parameter of interest – systematic uncertainties

Part IV: The two big school

Frequentist – occurrence frequency – pseudo-data (toys) – bayesian – degree of belief

Part VI: Parameter estimation & hypothesis testing

estimator and its properties – χ^2 – confidence/credibility level/interval – coverage – p -value – LLR

Conclusions

Concluding remarks

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→ not a single way → some arbitrariness

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Ernest Rutherford

"If your experiment needs a statistician, you need a better experiment"

Thanks for you attention !